Introduction
is chapter is devoted to the evaluation of the SIS compliance with Article ECHR and data protection principles. e human rights evaluation criteria analysed in Chapter and the data protection transparency and proportionality model developed in Chapter are used as evaluation tools. e discussion in this chapter is not based on the factual situation, but on the formal situation. It is a discussion on the obligations and rights.
e conclusions arrived at may not necessarily be the same conclusions that the ECtHR may make. e conclusions reached are based on the writer's interpretation of the obligations and rights in the Convention. e lack of Schengen case law at the ECHR level makes it di cult to say what the law is. e developments at the national level, however, seem to agree with what the writer thinks the law should be (see . . below). Systematic registration of personal information also amounts to interference with the respect for private life. In addition, the information need not be used (Amann v. Switzerland, Kopp v. Switzerland and Rotaru v. Romania) . e Schengen Convention allows systematic registration of personal data under Article ( ). e registration would amount to interference under Article ( ) even if the information was not put to use. e information recorded in the SIS, however, is systematically used for purposes of crime and border control. e storage of personal information also amounts to interference as the Court ruled in the cases of Leander v. Sweden and Amann v. Switzerland. Again here the information need not be used, the act of storage in itself amounts to interference for the purposes of Article ( ). Even where the information is used for the purpose intended or the purpose for which it was collected, it could also amount to interference (Rotaru v. Romania). For example, in SIS, the information is recorded for purpose of identi cation. Even where the information is used for this purpose it could still amount to interference with the respect for private life.
e human rights law under Article ( ) also places importance on individual access to registered information. Where access to information is denied, the Court has found this to amount to interference (Leander v. Sweden, McMichael v. United Kingdom, Gaskin v. United Kingdom and M.G. v. United Kingdom) . In the last two cases, the Court applied the doctrine of State's positive obligation to nd interference where access was denied. Although the right of access is recognised and provided for in the Schengen Convention, it has many obstacles which make it di cult to exercise and as such one may not necessarily get access to the information. Where the exercise of a right is difcult, it cannot be said that a person has a right. Similarly, the disclosure of information can amount to interference with private life under Article ( ) (M. S. v. Sweden, Leander v. Sweden, Z v. Finland and Peck v. United Kingdom) . e Schengen Convention allows disclosure of information to persons who need the information so as to perform their legal duties. While such disclosure or access to information is in accordance with personal data protection laws, under human rights law, the disclosure, even where allowed, can amount to interference with the respect for private life.
Lack of deletion of information procedure amounts to interference with the respect of private life (Amann v. Switzerland and Rotaru v. Romania) . e Schengen Convention stipulates deletion procedure and as such interference is di cult to construe purely by the lack of deletion procedures. If, however, the procedures are not followed, it would be possible to infer interference. e JSA had reported that Member States were, a er deletion of the information in the SIS, retaining the same information in the SIRENE system. Such practice would amount to interference because there are no clear deletion procedures under the SIRENE system. e information could be retained in the SIRENE for an inde nite duration.
It may be di cult for the SIS to comply with non-interference criterion unless the system does not exist. Most critics of the SIS have argued that the system should not have been brought into existence as its existence is a threat to privacy. e reality is that
